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T '* CLASSIFICATION OF THIS "ACI »hm I'mlm fiifüreiT (Block 10) studv in Appendix I idoutl fii's dislocation cell boundnric-s as the prominent microstructural feature of commercial nu 1 ti 1 i lamentary superconductors. Tliis feature is correlated with critic«] current and guidelines are provided for critical current enhancement in commercial conductors. The report in Appendix II describes a now technique for measuring grain s i/,e and thicknesses of the thin layers on the order of .5 ym which occur in the fabrication of Nb 3Sn by diffusion reactions. The correlation of the present results with those obtained using conventional thinning techniques is very good. The method is rapid and inexpensive compared to competing techniques and will be useful in new conductor development.
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The study, "I.lililriry Force u a Pollticol InEtnrr/.nt Since the Second World War", is intended to exMlna th« Mgn, Mid the effectiveness with which, the United Stat«! and the Soviet Union h&ve enirloycd their ormed fcrces, short of actual violence, during the period 19U6-1975 . in essence, the study is desigrud to illuminate the interconnections betv/ecn demonstrative displays of military force and the success or failure of foreign policy In the postwar period. A« the threat of direct conflict between the suporpewers has receded, the consequences of charges in the size and character of military inventories, the deployment of military unit:;, ana the use of military force for demonstrative purposes, have attained new prominence. This two-yenr study ~ founded on empirical analysis of the perhaps 3C0 incidei.ts since 19'^ in which either the United States or the USSR has utilized its armed forces, without sigrificant violence, in support of foreign policy objectives -'s intended to address the effectiveness of military force in these roles and to draw implications for U.S. foreign policy and the structure of U.S. armed forces.
As of 31 July 1971), the study had been underway for nine months. This period has been devoted to necessary steps preliminary to analysis: (a) concepts have been dosoritcd, terms defined, and methodelogies specified; (b) data describing each incide-nt, their diplcraatic end political contexts, and their outcomes have been collected and ere now being recc^dod in machine-readable form; (c) eight pairs of incidents have been selected for more detailed investigation and arrarigements made with specialists to carry out these case studies; (d) three topics nave been selected for special sub-analyses, and research initiated on them -"Soviet Conceptions and Applications of Military Force", The Political Uses of Military Force in the Mediterranean Region", and "The Political Consequences of the Use of Military Units for Disaster Relief and Other Humanitarian Purposes".
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d^ The conroquenccc. ioi)ft«m and short-term, that tend to Tollow these uses of military force.
To those ends, five specific tasks are to be undertaken.
First, we will prepare a comprehensive and detailed description of all incidents BMting the definitional criteria for consideration as a "political" use of military force. This task involves rigorous definition of the concept, «peoifiMtlon of relevant var'ables, and exhaustive search of official ana unoffioUl source material. Descriptive statistics will be used to present an analysis of trends in: the frequency with which the superpew.-rs employ their ar.~ed forces in this fashion, the ways in which the armed fcrces are used, the types of situations in which they arcused, the orfünizational process through which demonstrative use of the military is made apparent to target states and coordinated with diplomatic initiatives, the cmsequences of these actions for behavior of the target nations and interested third parties, and -most importantlythe consequences of political uses of military force for the satisfaction of the superpowers' o'.vn interests.
Second, an PgfMlgatC -and partially quantitative -analysis, aimed at examining the question of effectiveness will be carried out. When is military power, used without violence, an effective foreign policy instrument? What kinds of fcrces can most appropriately be used to this end? How are t.\ese forces best used in the context of other instruments of foreign policy? Can their use be counterproductive in some situations? Third, will be an in-depth investigation of the mechanisms determining the effectiveness of Bllltävy force as a political instrument. In this regard, case studies, designed to demonstrate the impact of particular variables which appear -on thi-basis of preliminary aggregate analysisto be the most important, will be prepared. All the case studies, which are to be prepared by specialists, will address a uniform set of questions and thus will provide a comparable series of detailed investigations.
Fourth, sub-analyses of particular aspects of the general topic will be attempted. These investigations will focus on the usefulness of particular types of military force for political ends and on the potential usefulness of demonstrative use of military force in particular situations.
Finally, findings of the three forms of analysis -aggregate, case studies, and topical sub-analyses ~ will be combined and conclusions drawn pertaining to the central questions of the study: How has military force been used by superpowers, short of actual violence, to attain foreign policy objectives? How effective has military force been in these roles? What do these findings imply for the structure of U.S. military forces?
As of 31 July 1975, the study had been underway for nine months of an expected two-year lifetime. Progress on the study to date can be described in four categories: concepts and methodology, aggregate analysis case studier, and topical sub-analyses. Each is discussed below. may be used to suprort the target so that it continues to do something desirable; or it rru^y be used to d^-u-r the tarret from Inltlttlag an undesirable action (or from stoprirv* a desirable action). If the target's behavior is rerceived negatiYgla or is considered undesirable, the actor's interest v;ill be to hfjve the tarf t stcv some Vehavior or t.' . ■ • in to do something else. The objective will be to mod}i'y previous behavior. In this regard, military force may be used in two ways, depending upon the context of the situation. The actor may withdraw or threaten to withdraw military force 7/hich has been used previously to support the target in order to deter the latter, or the actor can use military force to co'-ree the target. If the t&rget's behavior is viewed with question or has not been established, the actor's objective is to ensure that the target is doinr. net !c:rv. cr wil] do something. Insofar as the actor does not wish to press the target to manifest some behavior, the actor's interest may be merely to ensure that the target is d sfcsed to do or not do something. In consequence of the lack of clarity alout the target's behavior,' the \ii<'-of military force in such instances frequently will be ambiguous.
In regard to the third dimension, targets may be categorized in terras of whether they are generally su-nrortivr-of. &nt&ron's' t .ic to, or non-alirr/ d with the actor. In general, military force will be used in an operant mede to exercise suasion upon supportive actors and in an aversive mode to exercise suasion upon antagonistic actors. Military force may be used in either mode to exercise suasion upon non-aligned actors. However, the use of military force, and certainly its repeated use in one or the other of these two modes, may have the effect of influencing a non-aligned actor to become either supportive of or anttgonistic to the superpower.
The effectiveness of the use of military force as an instrument of suasion relates to an actor's success or failure in inducing desirable behavior on the part of the target of the action. A test of the effectiveness of using military force as an instrument of suasion requires a determination of the relationship between an actor's use of military force and behavior by the target. In order to conclude that a use of military force has not been effective, it is necess irj; to determine that desirable behavior was not induced. In order to ccnclude that a use of military force has been effective, it is necessar;. to determine that a target's behavior is desirable and that this woul' not be so in the absence of that use of military force. That a target is performing desirable, undesirable, or questionable behavior may be determined by observation.
A determination that a use of military force was a necessary condition for tue performance of desirable behavior or the existence of a positive disposition requires the identification of those factors underlying that conduit. It is possible to develop an analytic framework and, perhaps, even a model of the more important elements entering into the calculus of a target leader in response to a superpower demand, accompanied or not by the use of military force.
In making a chcico to perform or not to porform dtsIraLlc-behavior in the presence or in the abeence of military force, a tarpet will seek to determine: the faini md eorta of that particular behavior; Xha weights or tignifloaiio« Of those individual gains and costs; and the probabilities that those Individual ^alnj and costs will become manifest. For military force to be considered effective, it must alter the tarret's calculation of itl gains and costs in performing desirable behavior so that behavior is perrornkd which would not have been performed in the absence of such a use of force. Such a use of military force mignt affec; a calculation by altering the target's perceptions of the gains end costs relevant in a calculus, and/or the probabilities of their occurrence.
Concomitant with oprrationalisation of an analytic framework, a comparative analysis can be made of observations regarding that frameworK's elements with reference to the following paired situations; By doing a comparative analysis of situations 1 and 2, the circumstances in which military force is not an effective instrument for exercising suasion might be determined. A comparative analysis of situations 1 and 2, might also allow for a determination of those circumstances in which force ma^ be used effectively. A comparative analysis of situations 1 and 3 might allow us to determine the circumstances in which it is not necessary to use military force as an instrument of suasion. Finally, a comparative analysis of situations 1 and h might allow for a determination of the particular utility of using military force. The result of such cemparati/e analyses might be the inducement of an empirically based model of a target calculus in the presence and in the absence of military force being used as an instrument of suasion.
In developing hypotheses related to a target calculus, we postulate that the gains and costs considered by a target are, respectively, the positive and negative consequences of a choice for those matters of concern to the target. The greater the positive and the lesser the negative consequences anticipated as a result of the performance of positive behavior, the more likely the target is to perform that behavior. An important objective is to determine the positive and negative reinforceirents that a target anticipates as a result of its performing desirable behavior. Generally speaking, a target's concerns will relate to four strata of a society: the society at large, an elite, a faction, and the leader.
The relative weights placed by a leader upon matters of concern might be identified as a function of the leader's political environmenti.e., the operational structure of authority and the norms of political action within a society, and UM soeicty's socialization values. The operational structure of authority and the norms of political action within a society will determine the security and independence of a leader. V/e postulate that a leader will be concerned to satisfy personal goals and concerns to the extent that he is not bound by dependency and insecurity upon a faction, an elite, or f society. Concomitantaly, a leader fill be concerned to satisfy factional, elite, and societal goals and interests insofar as he internalizes them as his own; 01 , to the degree that the actualization of his goals jr the security of his interests and autrority are dependent upon the satisfaction of the concerns of these groups. Further, a leader will assume generally that gains and costs to groups which can be attributed to his leadership cannot but reflect upon his interests.
A target's calculus may be influenced by not only the actor's use of military force as an instrument of suasion and by other behavior (past, present, and anticipated) manifested by the actor, but also by the present and anticipated behavior of third parties in the incident. The likelihood that another actor will become involved in an incident end thus will influence a target's calculus of gains, costs, and their probabilities, will be a function of that actor's capabilities and perceived interests. In interstate relations an actor's influence upon a target's choice will usually be a consequence to the former's behavior functioning as an environmental variable. Much less frequently, an external actor will be able to penetrate a political system and exercise influence within it. Thus, for the most part, an actor's ability to influence directly a target's concerns will be limited to those concerns of the society at large. An actor may exert direct influence upon another society's concerns by manipulating the various instruments of foreign policy that it has at its command. Because our principal interest is in the use of military force as an instrument of suasion, we are especially concerned to discern the significance of the individual ways in which military force may be used. Another set of capabilities which a target w .11 consider in its calculus are its own capabilities; for viewed from another standpoint, every target also is a dynamic actor with policy i struments of its own available.
Notwithstanding the examination of the various interests and capabilities of each actor in a particular incident, it also is necessary to consider the target's -perce-ption of those interests and capabilities. Thi. nerception, of course, will be a function of the inforrafition madavailable by actors, the structural collection and presentation of information to the target, »nd the target's "screens" of ideology, experience, and self-actupli'^tlon. The availability of information relates to the manifes + '..c'^^ior by actors and to the existence, the prominence, and the clarity of signals that may be perceived. The structural collection and presentation of information will concern those institutions which at any mmmmmmmmtmmKKBi ■■■■■■ ■m
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given cime gather and make information available, and which are paid attention to by the target. Finally, the three screens of perception noted will determine the amount of attention a target will give to information received and the target's evaluation of that information.
Finally, it is important to consider for the purposes of this study the significance of "permanent" deployments of military force in the region in which an incident occurs, as v/ell as past usages of the superpowers' military forces in analogous situations. It la also useful to consider previously made verbal and written commitments which might prove relevant to a target's performance of desirable behavior. These three factors seem likely to have a most important effect on target perceptions. In this regard, hypotheses are being examined relating target behavior to: the length of time in which an ..".cor's military forces have been deployed In the region in which an incident occurs; the frequency with which an actor's military forces have been used effectively in the region in an analogous mode; the strergth of an actor's previous commitment to a situation complementary to the performance of desirable behavior,
Aggregate Analysis
The most time-consuming task has been the identification of incidents, and the collection of data describing them, their contexts, and their outcomes.
Military command histories and ether official documents have been the main sources used to identify incidents. In this regard, the study has been hampered by its lack of access to classified material, but not significantly so. Unofficial sources ~ New York Times. Keesigs Ccntemnorarv Archives, memoirs, etc. -have~been used to fill in the context of the incidents.
It looks now as if the United States has used its military forces in the pursuit of political suasion in approximately 200 incidents between 19h6 and 1975. Additionally, the-e 7/ere about 200 cases in which U.S. military forces were used for disaster relief and other humanitarian purposes. These latter uses presumably also resulted in. and were partially motivated by, political objectives. They will be treated in a separate sub-analysis.
Data describing the incidents are being placed in machine-reaaable form to facilitate the application of simple descriptive statistical techniques. A 2l+-page code schedule has been prepared for this purpose. Each incident will be described by KA variables, arrayed on 8 data cards. Additionally, time series data on 18 additional variables ~ to be used to assess the potential consequences of the political use of force, e.g. trade and aid statistics -also is being collected. Data preparation should be completed by the end of the current year, and the actual analysis of U.S. incidents then initiated.
It appears that the Soviet Union has eraployr.d its military forces for^political ends in approximately 60 incidents uetweer. I^k6 and 1975 The!?e are not sufficient data describing these ca^es, however, to warrant the same sort of analysis being applied to the U.S. incidents. Consequently, the Soviet use of military force as a political instrument is being treated as a separate topical sub-analysis.
Case Studies
The case studies are designed to provide detailed information on the variables determinia? the effectiveness of ml]itary force as a political instrument. Specific topics that will be addressed fa each of the case studies include:
. U t S. behavior: Objectives of U.S. decision-makers, the manner in which these were communicated to targets, relationshirs between the use of the military instrument and other foreign policy instruments.
. Target behavior; Who the targets (individual decision-makers) were and what were their interests, awareness of U.S. concerns, reasons for conforming or not conrorming to U.S. desires.
• Third party behavior; How these interventions may have affected the outcome of the incident. Eight pairs of cases have been selected. Together, the cases illustrate the wide variety of contexts in which the U.S. has made use of its armed forces for political ends. Each pair individually is designed to illustrate the potential utility of military force as a political instrument in a singular situation. Because each case study addresses the same set of questions, thus providing a comparable series of detailed investigations, together they should greatly aid understandings of the phenomena of concern. Topical Sub-analyses These investigations are designed to supplement the aggregate analyses and case studies for topics of particular interest. They will be carried out by members of the Brookings staff.
Three have been selected and outlined to date:
. The political consequences of the use of military units for disaster relief and other humanitarian purposes;
. Soviet conceptions and applications of r.ilitary force;
. The political uses of military force lr the Mediterranean region, Additional sub-analyses will probably be undertaken as time and study resources permit.
